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THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE: DESIRE TO PROMOTE PERCEIVED SOCIETAL
BENEFITS AND DENIAL OF THE RESULTING
DIFFICULTIES PRODUCES DICHOTOMY IN THE LAW
CAROLYN M. NICHOLS*

I.

INTRODUCTION

A.

The Facial Meaning of the Right of Confrontation
One of the most opaque phrases in the Bill of Rights is the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment which provides that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him."' The precise meaning of these
words has never been clear. Read literally, they suggest that the defendant
is guaranteed the opportunity to physically and verbally challenge people
who claim that he has committed a crime. This idea is belied immediately,
however, by the reality of courtroom procedure. The criminal defendant
enjoys no privilege to engage his accusers in a brawl. Hence the idea
of physical challenge remains only as the image of the accused and the
accuser regarding one another during trial. The verbal challenge is shaped
by the right of the criminal defendant to be represented by counsel,
which today means that he will never question witnesses himself unless
he has chosen to exercise a valid waiver. 2 Therefore actual verbal confrontation becomes the cross-examination of hostile witnesses by the
defendant's lawyer. Still, from the bare words of the Clause as filtered
through the realities of the modern courtroom, the image remains that
of the defendant physically facing the witness as the counsel for the
defense verbally attacks the inculpatory story the witness has told; yet
this image is far from uncontroversial.

B.

Points of Controversy
There are two focal points of controversy. The first is the true meaning
of the phrase "to be confronted," and the second is the definition of

* J.D., Yale Law School, 1993; B.A., University of New Mexico, 1990. Ms. Nichols is a
criminal defense and civil rights attorney, practicing in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The author
would like to thank Professor Abraham S. Goldstein, Criminal Law and Procedure, Yale Law
School, for his patience and invaluable assistance with this article; and Chris Graeser, second-year
student at the University of New Mexico School of Law, for his help with the research.
I. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2. For a discussion of the right to counsel see the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The right is not absolute, so an individual may not have the
right to an appointed counsel when on trial for certain minor offenses. However, should that
individual desire representation he or she may hire a lawyer.
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the words "witnesses against him." 3 As to the first, some theorists argue
that the key element of the aforementioned confrontation scenario is
verbal challenge 4 and that physical challenge is secondary and nonessential.5 In the minds of these commentators, the purpose of the Clause
is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against the defendant through
the use of cross-examination, regardless of whether this cross-examination
takes place in the presence of the defendant or before the jury. 6 Obviously,
this implies that the aforementioned physical confrontation is of little
value in weeding out falsehood. Other commentators strongly disagree
and argue that the jury obtains vital demeanor evidence by watching the
accuser face the accused during the trial since the presence of the defendant
may have the power to destabilize, or even to deter, a false witness. 7
This dispute is significant in two ways. First, its resolution will impact
the permissible range of trial procedures which limit the ability of the
witness and the defendant to see one another and the ability of the jury
to watch them both. Second, it will establish the conditions for the
admissibility of any out-of-court statements, such as prior testimony,
which have been tested by cross-examination but at some point prior to
the actual trial.
While that controversy touches upon both trial procedure and the
admissibility of one specific type of hearsay, the second controversy,
concerning the definition of "witnesses," impacts solely the use of any
hearsay as evidence in a criminal trial. The broadest, and perhaps intuitively most obvious, definition of the words "witnesses against him"
would include all persons who have knowledge of facts relevant to the
case against the accused which the prosecution wishes to present as
evidence. Assuming that "to be confronted" means at least that the
witnesses must be present and subjected to cross-examination, this reading
of "witnesses against him" implies that the exclusionary rule against
hearsay is a partial embodiment of the Clause itself. This in turn leads
to the inescapable conclusion that any exceptions to the hearsay rule
conflict with the protections that the Clause guarantees the accused. In
order to deal with this dilemma, many scholars hold to the theory that
the purpose of the Clause is to ensure the reliability of accusatory evidence,
merely using confrontation to symbolize one of many means, namely
cross-examination, of achieving that goal.' This interpretation enables
exceptions to the rule against hearsay to survive and evolve as long as

3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. See, e.g., 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: OF PRIVATE
WRONGS 373 (1979).
5. See, e.g., JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1362 (1983).
6. See BLACKSTONE, supra note 4, at 373.
7. See, e.g., WILLAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, 335-37 (1936); 1 JAMES F.
STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 430-33 (1883); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES

ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A PRELIMINARY REVIEW OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE COLONIES AND STATES BEFORE THE ADOPTION OF*THE CONSTITUTION

662 (1833).
8. See infra part V.B-C and note 59.
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they can be justified as inherently reliable. One problem with this idea
is its lack of coherence with the notion that cross-examination is a unique
protector of reliability, which is an idea frequently espoused by commentators and courts exploring the Clause's meaning. 9 Therefore, not all
theorists are comfortable with the aforementioned accommodation. 0 In
the minds of certain commentators, the solution is to define the words
"witnesses against him" narrowly, reading the Clause as applicable only
to those witnesses who actually appear and testify at trial." But this
interpretation is extremely confined, and the majority view is that the
Clause must serve as a prohibition against the use of at least some types
of hearsay statements, such as ex parte affidavits.' 2 Thus, one line of
argument holds to the narrow definition of witnesses, but adds the
qualification that, in light of the history of the Clause, hearsay contained
in formalized testimonial materials must be excluded. 3 One thing is clear:
the meaning of the Clause, despite its seeming simplicity, is obscure.
The Persistent Problem: Conflicting Implications Within Supreme
Court Opinions
This uncertainty has been perpetuated by the past few decades of
Supreme Court interpretation. From the earliest reading of the Clause
to the most recent, the Court has struggled to define the phrase "to be
confronted with the witnesses against him" in a way that avoids limiting
the expansion of exceptions to the rule against hearsay. 4 At the same
time, the Court has been reluctant to let go of the notion that the Clause
connotes a "preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial"' 5 entailing
both physical presence and verbal challenge. 6 The resulting confusion
surrounding the meaning of the Clause creates difficulties for trial courts
struggling with recent evidentiary and procedural innovations, and causes
dismay among both those who feel progress is being smothered, and
those who feel the rights of the accused are increasingly under attack
and under-protected. 7 Without a thorough explanation of the unique
importance of verbal and physical challenge-and in the context of case
law which impliedly diminishes the importance of both while simultaneously paying tribute to each-trial courts, legislators, and litigators are
left with very little concrete guidance in this important area of constitutional law.
C.

9. See infra notes 39, 44, 55, 71, 100-01, 143, 154-65, 196, 255-56 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 39, 44, 55, 71, 100-01, 143, 154-65, 196, 255-56 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 94 (1970) (Harlan, J.,concurring in result);
WIGMORE, supra note 5, at §§ 1395-1397.
12. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 362 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
13. Id. at 365.
14. See infra parts III-VI.
15. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980).
16. See infra parts III-VI, notes 279, 284 and accompanying text.
17. See infra part III.
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D. An Imminent Resolution?
Important contemporary cases, dealing with rules of evidence and trial
procedures designed to protect child victim/witnesses, have forced the
Court to confront the true value of both verbal and physical challenge. 8
This in turn has brought the conflicting implications of prior doctrine
sharply into focus, making it more difficult to avoid a final resolution.
The near future may see a uniform interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause. Whether it will be a reconciliation which strengthens the power
of the Clause to protect the individual defendant or one that severely
limits this power is a matter for mere speculation at this point, but
clearly the conflicting philosophies of Confrontation Clause doctrine are
ripe for unification.
This Article will first briefly explore the roots of the Confrontation
Clause, in an attempt to illustrate the source of the problems inherent
in every effort to interpret its true meaning. It will then analyze the
history of the United States Supreme Court interpretations of the Clause.
The first effort of the Court to define the Clause's parameters will be
used to expose the basic conflict which then troubled that group of
Justices and continues to trouble successive Courts. Next, a number of
major Confrontation Clause opinions will be investigated to show how
this historical dilemma hindered the efforts of the Warren Court to mold
the Clause into a strong barrier and haunted the efforts of the Burger
and Rehnquist Courts to weaken this barrier without reducing it to rubble.
Lastly, this Article will discuss a line of contemporary cases which have
forced the Court to squarely face the internal conflict which has persisted
within Confrontation Clause opinions for more than a hundred years.
At that point, some modest suggestions as to the factors the Court should
consider in resolving this doctrinal disharmony will be offered.
II.

THE ORIGINS OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
A. Relevance
When the Court searches for the meaning of a constitutional provision,
it can either employ an analysis of the language of the text itself, read
in the light of precedent, or engage in "strict" construction and focus
solely on the original intent of the Framers.19 In the case of the Confrontation Clause, neither approach produces an easy answer.20 Because
the language and the historical precedent do not point clearly in any one
direction, it is tempting to explore what the Framers had in mind when
they guaranteed to the criminal defendant in a federal court the right
"to be confronted with the witnesses against him."'"
Unfortunately, this exploration leads only to speculation and conjecture.
Perhaps the one fact which most historical commentators can agree upon

18. See infra part VI.
19. See infra part VI.
20. Id.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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is that the Framers probably meant to eliminate the possibility of a return
to the practice of trial by ex parte depositions in lieu of live testimony.22
In any event, it seems logical that the inclusion of the right of confrontation in the Sixth Amendment indicated at least some degree of
preference for live testimony over the introduction of extrajudicial statements. This suggests that an exploration of the hearsay rule as it stood
during the Colonial Era might be enlightening.
The History of the Hearsay Rule
At the time that the Bill of Rights was drafted, the general rule that
hearsay evidence should be excluded at trial was well-established under
the common law. 2 As early as the 1500s, the English legal system
recognized a variation of the modern hearsay rule. 24 This precursor to
today's hearsay rule mandated that the witness speak from his own
personal knowledge which could include the contents of statements he
had heard from the mouths of others. 25 Courts acknowledged that evidence
which did not meet that requirement was inferior, yet objections were
still generally overruled and the testimony allowed, if only to corroborate
other evidence. 26 Apparently this practice was the root of the doctrine
that prior statements of witnesses are admissible to show the consistency
of their stories. 27 Hence the evolution of the modern rule had begun,
and by the 1600s, courts began to reject all testimony as to the assertions
of people not called as witnesses. 28 John H. Wigmore eloquently summarizes this progression. In his words:
What we find then, in the development of the Hearsay rule is: (1)
A period up to the middle 1500s, during which no objection is seen
to the -use by the jury of testimonial statements by persons not in
court; (2) then a period of less than two centuries, during which a
sense arises of the impropriety of such sources of information, and
the notion gradually but definitely shapes itself, in the course of hard
experience, that the reason of this impropriety is that all statements
to be used as testimony should be made only where the person to
be affected by them has an opportunity of probing their trustworthiness
by means of cross-examination; (3) finally, by the beginning of the
1700s, a general 29and settled acceptance of this rule as a fundamental
part of the law.
B.

The earliest recognized exception to this general rule was triggered by
the physical unavailability of the witness. 30 Only a handful of other

22. See, e.g., William. H. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due
Process-A Proposal for Determining when Hearsay may be Used in Criminal Trials, 6 CoNN. L.
REV.

529, 532 (1974).

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 214-19.
Id.at 214-16.
Id.
Id.at 216.
Id.at 217.
Id.
WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 1364.
See id.at §§ 1421, 1430.
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exceptions to the rule had been developed by the time the Clause was
drafted.3 1 Those were based on two principles: necessity, obviously related
to the unavailability rule; and the "circumstantial probability of trustworthiness. " 3 2 Of the few widely-recognized exceptions in existence during
the early 1700s, those most relevant to the criminal law consisted of
dying declarations, 33 statements of facts against interest, 34 the attestation
of a subscribing witness to a document as proof of the document's
execution,35 and spontaneous exclamations made in the context of a
startling occasion, before the person had time to fabricate, related to
the circumstances of the occurrence. 36 The existence of the hearsay rule
and these basic exceptions is at the heart of the controversy over the
meaning of the Clause today.
C.

Historical Sources of Controversy with Modern Implications
Certain historians believe the Framers meant the Confrontation Clause
to be a codification of the rule against hearsay. 37 If this is true, then
the question becomes whether they meant to freeze the rule as it existed
at that time, or simply meant to ensure that it would survive and continue
to evolve on the basis of necessity and "circumstantial probability of
trustworthiness. 3 8 Other commentators insist that the Framers meant to
embody an ideal above and beyond the hearsay rule, since the hearsay
rule is a fluid concept which fails to grant the individual defendant much
solid protection against the power of the State. 9 Certainly the Framers
must have been aware that a literal interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause would implicate the constitutionality of existing exceptions to the
hearsay rule in the context of criminal trials. If their intent was to
eliminate such exceptions entirely, they would have made some specific
comment to that effect. The dilemma lies in reading the Clause in a way
that makes it more than a mere embodiment of the ever-changing hearsay
rule, without flatly prohibiting the use of exceptions to the hearsay rule
at criminal trials. One approach to this problem is to assume that the
Framers meant to ensure the survival of the spirit of the rule as it existed
during their era.

31. See id.at §§ 1420-1427.
32. See id.at §§ 1421-1422.
33. See id.at §§ 1430-1452.
34. See id.at §§ 1455-1477.
35. See WIGMoRE, supra note 5, at §§ 1505-1514.
36. See id. at §§ 1745-1764 (this exception was not very well-defined until the beginning of the
1800s, but it was present in various forms during the 1700s).
37. See, e.g., WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 1362.
38. See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 214-19.
39. See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Restoring the Confrontation Clause to the Sixth Amendment,
35 UCLA L. REV. 557 (1988); Randolph N.. Jonakait, Commentary: A Response to Professor
Berger. The Right to Confrontation: Not a Mere Restraint on Government, 76 MINN. L. REV. 615
(1992); David E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause, the Right Against Self-Incrimination and
the Supreme Court: A Critique and Some Modest Proposals, 20 DUQ. L. Rv.429 (1982); David
E. Seidelson, The Confrontation Clause and the Supreme Court: Some Good News and Some Bad
News, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 51 (1988).
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As historical sources illustrate, the rule was supported by the theory
that cross-examination was vital to test the reliability of a witness's
statements, and was secondarily reinforced by the notion that a witness
should be required to testify under oath ° It is important to keep in
mind that cross-examination was considered essential; the fact that the
statement had been sworn to when it was made was irrelevant unless the
witness had been subjected to questioning by the accused. A good example
of this is the 1696 case of R. v. Paine, in which the rule excluding
hearsay was applied to statements made under oath on the grounds that
the defendant had not been present when the depositions were taken and
hence had lost the benefit of cross-examination. 4 Wigmore supported
this position, arguing that the rule embodied the idea that statements
had to be subjected to cross-examination and confrontation.4 2 Thus, he
believed that "[tihe right of confrontation [was] the right to the opportunity of cross-examination. ' 43 He also felt that "[c]onfrontation
involve[d] a subordinate and incidental advantage, namely, the observation
by the tribunal of the witness' demeanor on the stand, as a minor means
of judging the value of his testimony."" Wigmore would not agree that
the Framers, in incorporating the general rule against hearsay into the
Constitution through the auspices of the Confrontation Clause, meant
to emphasize the element of face-to-face confrontation during the trial
as much as they meant to guarantee the accused the right to crossexamine the witnesses against him.
This belief is the root source of the controversy concerning the definition
of the words "to be confronted. ' 45 Some scholars hold to Wigmore's
view while others insist that the element of physical challenge is just as
important as the element of verbal challenge." Given the definition of
the word "evidence" as "whatever influences a jury on propositions
material to a case," ' 47 it is theoretically possible that the Framers believed
actual physical confrontation during the trial between the accuser and
accused would produce valuable demeanor evidence for the jury and,
therefore, that cross-examination lacking that element would be insufficient to meet the edicts of the Confrontation Clause. In this age of
innovations, such as closed-circuit television, which make the removal of
the physical challenge inherent in traditional cross-examination possible,
the importance of both types of confrontation becomes a pressing issue.4
The controversy over the meaning of the words "the witnesses against
him" also stems from the historical coexistence of the Clause and the

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

See, e.g., HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 214-19; WIGMORE, supra note 5, at §§ 1420-1427.
See HOLDSWORTH, supra note 7, at 218-19.
WIGMORE, supra note 5, at § 1365.
Id.

Id.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
Ronald J. Allen, Unexplained Aspects of the Theory of teh Right to Trial by Jury, in THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING, 354 (Eugene W. Hickock ed.,
1991).
48. See infra part VI.D.
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rule against hearsay. The debate, however, centers on whether these words
implicate all people with relevant information used at trial, or merely
implicate those who actually appear in person to testify at trial. This
controversy is arguably illogical, assuming that the Framers must have
intended some working relationship between the exceptions to the hearsay
rule and the Confrontation Clause. The likelier meaning of the words
is the former. Instead of trying to divorce the Clause from the hearsay
rule by adopting the tighter second definition, the search for meaning
should remain focused, broadly, on the philosophy behind the hearsay
rule. Rather than merely exploring the values of physical and verbal
confrontation, a necessary first step, the locus of this debate should be
the reasoning behind the hearsay rule exceptions and the relationship
between that reasoning and the protections guaranteed by the Clause.
This is not an easy task, given the controversy over the relative values
of physical and verbal confrontation. Weighing the combined effectiveness
of both those protections against the level of necessity and reliability
inherent in various hearsay exceptions is a challenge the United States
Supreme Court has thus far avoided. But in this age of innovation, when
new exceptions to the hearsay rule that deviate widely from the old
traditional exceptions are being used to introduce accusatory evidence
without the test of cross-examination, 49 the need for a solution is pressing.
The Supreme Court must clarify the power of the Clause to prohibit
trial procedures that restrict or eliminate the elements of physical confrontation inherent in traditional cross-examination and the ability of the
Clause to limit the creation of new exceptions to the rule against hearsay
that bypass confrontation altogether. These questions are interrelated,
because it will be necessary to determine the importance of both verbal
and physical confrontation before either question can be answered satisfactorily.
III.

THE EARLIEST, AND STILL INFLUENTIAL, SUPREME
COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE: MATTOX v. UNITED STATES

Description
The dilemma of resolving the relationship between the apparent demands
of the Confrontation Clause and the exceptions to the hearsay rule first
appears in an opinion over one-hundred years old, known as Mattox v.
United States5 0 Mattox was tried and convicted of murder in a federal
district court, but the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and ordered
a new trial." During his second trial, the prosecution was allowed to
present as evidence against him the testimony of two witnesses from the

A.

49. See infra part VI.E-F. For New Mexico treatment of the issue, see infra part VIII.
50. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
51. See id. at 238.
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first trial who had both subsequently died.12 This testimony was the
strongest proof the state had of Mattox's guilt. 3 Both of the witnesses
were present, examined, and fully cross-examined at the first trial, but
the defendant argued that his right of confrontation was violated by the
admission of transcripts of their prior testimony during his second trial
because he was 5unable
to confront the since-deceased witnesses in front
4
of his, new jury.
B.

Holding
In laying out the mission of the Confrontation Clause, the Supreme
Court stated that it was meant to guarantee:
personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which
the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection
and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to
stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief."
The Court considered both verbal and physical confrontation important
protections afforded by the Clause; but the Court immediately qualified
this sweeping statement, noting that even though there were strong reasons
to believe that these protections should never be denied, "general rules
of law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable
to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of public
policy and the necessities of the case." '5 6 Suddenly the ability of the
Clause to guarantee those protections was no longer clear. A few paragraphs later, the Court restated its public policy argument more emphatically, stating that "[t]he law in its wisdom declares that the rights
of the public shall not be wholly sacrificed in order that an incidental
benefit may be preserved to the accused." 57 In weighing the needs of
society against the right of the accused to confront his accusers, the
Court labeled the concept of physical and verbal confrontation before
the actual trier of fact "an incidental benefit" 5 8 while earlier in the same
opinion it lauded it as an important test of witness credibility.5 9
The Court then explained that a dying declaration, as an established
exception to the rules requiring the exclusion of hearsay, was also an
exception to the confrontation right, because credibility was the goal of
both edicts and that type of extrajudicial statement had historically been
viewed as credible absent the tests of the adversary process. 6 Because
the prior testimony of the deceased witnesses had been tested by cross-

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 240.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 242-43.
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 242-43.
Id. at 243-44.
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examination at the first trial, it too had an aura of reliability. 6' This
factor, in combination with the balancing test between societal benefits
and the rights of the accused, led the Court to its holding that the
transcript was admissible evidence despite the absence of the opportunity
to cross-examine the witnesses at the trial. 62 By implying that testing the
evidence before a jury other than the one that would decide the ultimate
issue of guilt was a satisfactory, if only partial, fulfillment of the goal
of the Clause, the Court implicitly reduced the value of the demeanor
evidence it had earlier stressed. 63 Ultimately the Court emphasized that
the admission of dying declarations and the previously-tested testimony
of dead (irretrievably unavailable) witnesses was an exception to the rule
that an accused have the right to engage in traditional cross-examination
at trial.64 Even so, the Court had cracked open the door for future
limitations of the scope of the Confrontation Clause without adequately
explaining the value and utility of the protections afforded by the Clause
or the weight those protections should be given.
C. Underlying Considerations
Important reasons lay behind this apparent failure of the Court to
clarify the implications of its holding. The Justices found themselves torn
between the two aspects of Confrontation Clause analysis which continue
to plague the Supreme Court to this day. 65 On the one hand, the Court
did not want to interpret the Clause in a such a way that all exceptions
to the rule against hearsay would become unconstitutional. On the other
hand, the Court did not want to completely drain the Clause of its power
to compel physical and verbal challenge at trial by reducing the confrontation right to the equivalent of an ever-malleable rule of evidence.
Seeing no easy way to reconcile the existence of exceptions to the hearsay
rule with the guarantee of confrontation provided by the Clause and
thus solve the dilemma, the Court instead charted an uneasy path between
the two evils, leaving them to trouble future Courts. The path between
them became increasingly difficult to navigate over time, and Confrontation Clause interpretation has been convoluted and confusing and remains so today.
THE COURT ATTEMPTS TO STRENGTHEN THE
INDEPENDENT POWER OF THE CLAUSE WITHOUT
UNDULY* LIMITING INNOVATION
A. Pointer v. Texas
In the middle to late 1960s, the Court attempted to bolster the protection
the Clause afforded the criminal defendant by emphasizing its literal
meaning. In Pointer v. Texas, 66 the Court declared that the Confrontation
IV.

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244.
Id.
See id. at 242-43.
Id. at 242.
See infra parts III-VI.
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
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Clause protected a fundamental right of the accused and was applicable
to state criminal proceedings through the auspices of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 67 Central to the holding was the decision that the receipt
into evidence of the alleged victim's preliminary hearing testimony violated
the accused's right of confrontation because he had no opportunity to
effectively cross-examine the witness at his trial. 68 The Court acknowledged
Mattox, noting that dying declarations were still constitutional exceptions
to the rule and adding that if the victim/witness' "statement [had] been
taken at a full-fledged hearing at which petitioner had been represented
by counsel who had been given a complete and adequate opportunity to
cross-examine" the case would almost certainly have been decided differently. 69 The Pointer Court did not pay lip service to the idea that
societal interests were weights which might appropriately be balanced
against the individual right of the accused to confront his accusers; instead,
the court strongly emphasized the equation of confrontation with crossexamination. "There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court
and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the right of confrontation and cross-examination
is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial
which is this country's constitutional goal." 70
The process of cross-examination was described as valuable in and of
itself as a method of "exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in
the trial of a criminal case."17 1 The Court does not even hint that if the
goal of credibility is otherwise met cross-examination becomes unnecessary.
Given this reasoning, it is unclear why Pointer did not overrule the
exception Mattox carved out for dying declarations. Obviously, they were
struggling with the same dilemma that taunted that earlier Court. Unfortunately, the Justices did not attempt to explain why cross-examination
was an inherently special embodiment of confrontation although they
strongly implied that the process had unique powers. 72 This, combined
with the failure to expressly prohibit the balancing of societal interests
against the right of confrontation and the carving out of exceptions to
the clause on reliability grounds, left large chinks in the armor that the
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation provides criminal defendants.
B. Douglas v. Alabama
The Court went on to reinforce the equation of the process of crossexamination with the right of confrontation in Douglas v. Alabama,7 3 a
case involving a witness who appeared at trial but refused to speak,

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 403.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 405.
Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404.
See id. at 403-07.
380 U.S. 415 (1965).
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citing his Fifth Amendment rights.7 4 His statement to the police was the
strongest evidence against the accused.7 5 Even though he was present and
"cross-examined" by the prosecutor, who had him declared a hostile
witness in order to read the contents of his confession into evidence
under the guise of refreshing his recollection, the Court held that his
silence rendered him unavailable for cross-examination by the defendant
and that76under those circumstances the Confrontation Clause had been
violated.
At no point did the Court raise the specter of a balancing test, implying
that the injury to society's interest in getting all available evidence before
the jury was not a valid reason to weaken the protection afforded the
defendant by the Confrontation Clause, manifested by cross-examination.
Further strengthening the link between verbal challenge and the confrontation right, the Court argued "that a primary interest secured by
[the Clause] is the right of cross-examination; an adequate opportunity
for cross-examination may satisfy the Clause even in the absence of
physical confrontation. ' 77 This drift away from the view that demeanor
of cross-examination would
evidence is an important aspect of the process
78
become extremely important in later years.
C. Bruton v. United States
Bruton v. United States79 was the next major Supreme Court case
emphasizing the connection between cross-examination and confrontation.
It involved a joint trial of codefendants in which the confession of one
was a crucial thread in the fabric of the evidence against the other.80 A
postal inspector testified that Evans had orally confessed, implicating
Bruton as well. 81 Evans refused to take the stand, and, therefore, the
82
confessor could not be cross-examined as to the truth of the confession.
A limiting instruction was given the jury, telling them to consider the
confession only as evidence against Evans and to disregard it entirely
when considering the guilt of Bruton.83 The Supreme Court reversed
Bruton's conviction, holding that in the context of a joint trial, limiting
instructions, even though clear, could not possibly cure the prejudice
caused the defendant by the introduction of an inculpatory, non-crossexaminable confession of a codefendant. 8 4 Hence, the defendant's right
to cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause had been violated. 85
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Id.at 416.
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In reaching this decision, the Court rejected both the argument that
the search for truth justified the admittance of the confession along with
hollow limiting instructions and the argument that the societal benefits
provided by joint trials should not be jeopardized by rulings which made
them difficult to conduct constitutionally.16 Judge Learned Hand had
previously stated that even though limiting instructions in those types of
cases were "placebo[s]" rather than real medicine, the confessions should,
nevertheless, be used in furtherance of the goal of reaching the truth.8 7
The Court replied that where there were viable, alternative ways of proving
the guilt of the nonconfessing coaccused "without at the same time
infringing the nonconfessor's right of confrontation," it was "deceptive
to rely on the pursuit of truth to defend a clearly harmful practice." 88
As to the second argument, the Court stated that even though "[jloint
trials do conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and
public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused of crime
to trial," ' 89 those were not valid reasons to take away the right of crossexamination guaranteed the accused by the Sixth Amendment.20 The Court
apparently disapproved of both the search for truth argument and the
societal argument in general.
This, however, is belied at least in part by a footnote in which the
Court noted that this codefendant's confession would not be admissible
against the defendant under any exception to the hearsay rule and that
their holding should not be read to imply that hearsay exceptions were
necessarily at odds with the Confrontation Clause. 9' Hearsay exceptions,
which by their nature necessarily deny the right of cross-examination the
Court hailed as an important aspect of the Confrontation Clause, are
often justified by precisely the arguments the Court rejected. Those who
believe hearsay rule exceptions do not violate the Clause argue, as the
Mattox Court did, that the exceptions further the truth-seeking process
by guaranteeing the reliability of evidence, the underlying goal of the
right of confrontation, through the admission of statements that are
somehow inherently trustworthy. Another common justification, which
is also a logical extension of the Mattox Court's reasoning, is that the
prohibition of the development of new exceptions would freeze the evolution of the hearsay rule, hence denying society the benefits of flexibility
and appropriate change in the judicial system. In the face of the everpresent Mattox dilemma, the Bruton Court left open the possibility that
circumventing the confrontation right altogether through the use of a
hearsay exception may be less odious than violating it outright and
attempting to cure the violation through the use of limiting instructions.
During the next two decades, as the Court shifted towards favoring the
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87.
88.
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See Id. at 134-36.
Id. at 132-33.
Id. at 133-34.
Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134.
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Id. at 128 n.3.
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interests of society over the rights of criminal defendants, this weakness
in Bruton was recognized and exploited.
V.

THE COURT STEADILY REDUCES THE INDEPENDENT
POWER OF THE CLAUSE

Transition
The post-Bruton years saw'a steady increase in the weighing of the
rights of the defendant against the interests of society and the use of
the reliability rationale, shrinking the boundaries the Court had previously
set around the Clause. 92 By the early 1980s, the Court clearly felt that
intrusions on the Bruton rule were warranted by public policy considerations. 93 Yet language hailing the importance of confrontation through94
cross-examination remained scattered throughout the opinions of this era.
The ring of the words, however, grew increasingly more hollow with
each new inroad into the shrinking realm of the Clause's power.

A.

Ohio v. Roberts
In Ohio v. Roberts,95 the Supreme Court reduced the Confrontation
Clause to the equivalent of the rule against hearsay, and, therefore,
vulnerable to any and all of its exceptions, although the Court explicitly
disavowed that this was the result of its holding. 96 The case concerned
a witness for the prosecution who had testified, but had not been crossexamined, at the defendant's preliminary hearing, and who was determined
to be validly unavailable at the time of the trial. 97 The state relied upon
a statutory exception to the hearsay rule, turning on the availability of
the witness, to use the transcript of the preliminary hearing testimony
as evidence. 9 Despite the fact that the witness had not technically been
cross-examined at the hearing, the Justices held that the defendant's
confrontation right was not violated by the use of the transcript at his
trial. 99
The Court argued that the Confrontation Clause "reflect[ed] a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial" as a means of testing the
accuracy of the testimony.10 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court,
noted some of the elements of cross-examination which made it a unique
test of credibility: allowing the factfinder to view any discrediting demeanor aroused by techniques of cross-examination, making it difficult

B.
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for an accuser to lie about the culpability of the accused since the latter
was also present in the courtroom, and putting the witness under oath
and subject to the penalties of perjury for false testimony. 1°1 However,
immediately following this brief exploration of the values of cross-examination, Justice Blackmun declared that the Supreme Court "[had]
recognized that competing interests, if 'closely examined,' [might] warrant
dispensing with confrontation at trial."' 102 Those interests included "effective law enforcement, and .. the development and precise formulation
of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings."' 13 The line
between these two state interests is fuzzy in this context. Rules of evidence
are exclusionary creatures, designed to keep unreliable information out
of courtrooms, hence aiding the truth-seeking process and the defendant,
but in Roberts the interest described by Justice Blackmun lies in creating
exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Those exceptions allow prosecutors
to present otherwise prohibited evidence to the fact-finder, so in a sense
both of the interests the Court mentions could be seen as consisting
solely of the former: the state's interest in effective law enforcement.
The Court proceeded to provide some guidelines for determining which
hearsay exceptions should be allowed to override the Confrontation Clause
in the name of the public good:
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination
at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that
he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted
hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at
least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. 104
This test boils down to the general reasoning behind most hearsay exceptions: necessity and "circumstantial probability of trustworthiness."1
Conspicuously absent is any explanation of how this formula relates
to the unique aspects of cross-examination, the verbal and physical embodiment of the confrontation right. Instead, the Court concluded that
the defense counsel's questioning of the witness at the preliminary hearing
had been the equivalent of cross-examination, even though it was not
labeled as such. 1°6 Using this reasoning, the Court was able to hold,
without confronting the Mattox dilemma, that the use of the transcribed
testimony was constitutional. 17 This ruling ignores and therefore belittles

101. Id. at 63.
102. Id. at 64.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 66.
105. WIGMORE, supra note 5, at §§ 1422-1423.
106. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-74.
107. The Roberts Court relied on an earlier decision, California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970)
(holding that testimony subjected to cross-examination at a preliminary hearing could be introduced
at trial despite the unavailability of the witness for cross-examination at the time of trial and
implying that perhaps a mere opportunity for cross-examination, even where no cross-examination
actually occurred, would be sufficient to meet the demands of the Confrontation Clause).
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the importance of the elements Justice Blackmun himself listed as unique
benefits of cross-examination. 08 The preliminary hearing is never before
the jury and rarely before the trial judge, so the factfinder who must
determine the culpability of the accused does not have the opportunity
to observe the demeanor of the accuser relating his inculpatory story
while the accused watches. The implication is that the physical aspect
of confrontation before the factfinder is not important after all, and
Justice Blackmun's description of traditional cross-examination as a special
tool to uncover falsehood becomes, at least in part, mere puffery.
C. United States v. Inadi
The case of United States v. Inadi'°9 takes the limitation of the Confrontation Clauses's power one step further. The Court held that the
Confrontation Clause did not prohibit the admission of statements made
by unindicted and nontestifying alleged coconspirators as evidence against
an individual on trial for conspiring to manufacture and distribute methamphetamines." '0 No showing of the unavailability of the witnesses had
been made, and the Court held that none was required."' The Court
did not address the issue of the reliability of the statements since the
lower court had held that regardless of whether the statements were
reliable, a showing of unavailability was necessary under Roberts. 2 Inadi
made clear that the Roberts unavailability requirement was contextually
limited to the admission of hearsay statements made during a prior judicial
proceeding."'
The Court theorized that "former testimony often [was] only a weaker
substitute for live testimony,"11 4 while coconspirators' out-of-court statements, "[b]ecause they are made while the conspiracy is in progress ...
provide evidence of the conspiracy's context that cannot be replicated,
even if the declarant testifies to the same matters in court.""' 5 This
argument stretches the necessity rationale behind hearsay exceptions to
include desirability. In order to present the theoretically better version
of the evidence at trial, it is necessary to allow in this hearsay. Furthermore, an unavailability rule would place a "practical burden" on
the State, because it would have to locate potential declarants and attempt
6
to secure their presence at trial."
Not satisfied with these two rationales, desirability and difficulty, the
Court proceeded to a third argument: that cross-examination will be of
small utility to the defendant in these situations." l7 In an earlier case,
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the majority of the Court conceded that the Confrontation Clause gave
the defendant the right to "an opportunity for effective cross-examination.""' This statement, extended to its logical conclusion, implies that
trials of multiple codefendants violate the Confrontation Clause whenever
they place the accused in a situation where cross-examination cannot
realistically help him. Ironically, the argument that cross-examination
would be of small utility to a defendant in such a situation was used
in Inadi to justify its absence.
D. Bourjaily v. United States
In Bourjaily v. United States,11 9 the Court essentially dropped the facade
of differentiation between the Confrontation Clause and established hearsay rules. The opinion declared that the federal hearsay exception allowing
in statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy by a nontestifying
coconspirator, did not violate the right of confrontation due to the
theoretical reliability of such statements. 20 Inadi had already done away
with the Roberts requirement of unavailability in those cases, and in
Bourjaily, the Court decided that the "independent indicia of reliability"
test was not constitutionally mandated either.' 2 ' After all, the majority
reasoned, most hearsay exceptions had been created with an eye towards
one or both of those guidelines, necessity and reliability, and the Court
in Roberts had mentioned that "firmly rooted hearsay exception[s]" were
22 "We
presumed to meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause.
think that the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule is firmly rooted
enough in .our jurisprudence that, under this Court's holding in Roberts,
not independently inquire into the reliability of such statea court need
23
ments.'"
Justifying this interpretation as an accommodation of the "goal of the
Clause-placing limits on the kind of evidence that may be received
against a defendant-with a [competing] societal interest in accurate
factfinding, which may require consideration of out-of-court statements,"' 2 4 the Court implied that the confrontational demands of the
Clause may work against the search for truth by keeping out reliable
evidence. Hence, cross-examination may be unnecessary to test the accuracy of some accusatory stories. The language of confrontation is
reduced to mere symbolism, only requiring the existence of rules of
evidence which somehow keep out unreliable material.
Justice Blackmun, the author of the Roberts opinion, dissented, in
large part, because "despite the recognized need by prosecutors for coconspirator statements, these statements often have been considered to
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be somewhat unreliable."12 The Court in Bourjaily set aside the safeguard
that evidence independent from the statements themselves show the existence of a conspiracy before the statements could be admitted, and
Justice Blackmun felt this altered the common law exception too much
for it to qualify as "firmly rooted.' ' 26 The majority had not attempted
to explain the "indicia of reliability" this modified exception allegedly
possessed, and they had not honestly analyzed how "firmly rooted" it
truly was in American jurisprudence.127 For these reasons, Justice Blackmun felt they had conducted an inconsistent analysis. 2 Ironically, his
earlier opinion in Roberts cleared the path for the Court's decision in
29
Bourjaily.'
VI. THE COURT CONFRONTS VARIOUS RULES DESIGNED TO
PROTECT YOUNG VICTIM/WITNESSES
A.

Pennsylvania v. Ritchie
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 30 a case involving a thirteen-year-old girl
who accused her father of repeatedly raping her, the Court faced the
question of whether the Confrontation Clause guaranteed the defendant
access to information likely to aid in the development of a successful
cross-examination which the State wanted to keep strictly confidential."'
In a section of the Court's opinion not joined by the otherwise concurring
Justice Blackmun, the Confrontation Clause was described as "provid[ing]
two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically
to face those who testify against him, and the right to conduct crossexamination." ' 32 The opinion held that the defendant's right of confrontation had not been violated by the State's denial to the defendant
of access to a file the State wished to keep confidential, even though
timely knowledge of the file's contents might have made cross-examination
of the alleged victim a significantly more effective tool. 3
The opinion stressed that the Confrontation Clause was concerned with
procedures at the actual trial and not with pre-trial discovery which might
affect those procedures. 3 4 The Court declared that "the Confrontation
Clause only guarantee[d] 'an opportunity for effective cross-examination,
not cross-examination that [was] effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might [have] wish[ed]. '" 35 Emphasis was impliedly
placed on the State's valid interests in protecting the confidentiality of
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the records in question to shield the alleged victim and to facilitate in
not explicitly cited, public
general the exposure of child abuse. 3 6 Although
7
interest loomed large in the background.'1
Justice Blackmun agreed with every section of the Court's opinion
except the one discussed above. In his view, an examination of the actual
effectiveness of the cross-examination had to go hand-in-hand with an
analysis of a possible Confrontation Clause violation.'38 If cross-examination had been effective, the defendant could not then complain that
another method of cross-examination would have been more effective. 3 9
Kentucky v. Stincer
Later that same year, the Supreme Court heard arguments in Kentucky
v. Stincer'4° concerning the constitutionality of excluding the defendant,
competency of
but not his attorney, from a hearing to determine the
4
two children who accused him of sexual molestation.' '
Because the admission of hearsay was not directly at issue, the Court
was able to focus solely on the scope of the right of cross-examination,
and the majority stated simply that the defendant was entitled, at a
minimum, to have the opportunity to confront the accuser during the
actual trial. 42 The opinion discusses the benefits of confrontation at the
actual trial as opposed to the preliminary testimonial stages of the criminal
process, including the following: the ability of the factfinder to observe
the demeanor of the testifying witness; the fruitfulness of consultation
between the defendant and his counsel during the questioning of an
accuser; and the success of the tool of cross-examination at weeding out
false testimony. Cases involving the admission of hearsay without the
opportunity for cross-examination at trial were dismissed as somehow
unrelated to the case at hand,' 43 leaving open the possibility that, had
the defendant been present at the competency hearing, and had the girls
been cross-examined by his advocate, the Court might have labelled that
questioning the equivalent of cross-examination under Roberts and Green
and deemed it admissible as trial evidence in the form of a transcript.
Of course, this possibility is purely hypothetical, but it is troubling
nonetheless. '44
B.

C. Coy v. Iowa
In 1988, the Supreme Court in Coy v. Iowa 14, evaluated one of the
many innovative state statutes, created during the 1980s, to ease the
136. Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 42-43.
137. See id. (stating that "[tlhe question presented in this case is whether and to what extent a
State's interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse must yield to
a criminal defendant's Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to discover favorable evidence.").
138. Id. at 61-62 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
139. Id. at 63.
140. 482 U.S. 730 (1987).
141. Id. at 732-33.
142. Id. at 744 (Blackmun, J., writing for the majority).
143. See id. at 737-39.
144. Id. at 736-42.
145. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
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trauma of courtroom testimony for young victims/witnesses of sexual
abuse. A growing concern for victims in general and a dramatic increase
in the number of reported cases involving the sexual abuse of minors
resulted in a flurry of legislative activity. 46 Courts needed guidance. Many
judges had begun taking steps on their own to protect the psyches and
facilitate the testimony of the little victims/witnesses in their courtrooms,
and uniform procedures were the next logical step.147 One of the new
statutes was Iowa Code Section 910A.14 (1987), first enacted in 1985,
which provided in part:
The court may require a party be confined [sic] to an adjacent room
or behind a screen or mirror that permits the party to see and hear
the child during the child's testimony, but does not allow the child
to see or hear the party. However, if a party is so confined, the
court shall take measures to insure that the party and counsel can
confer during the testimony and shall inform the
4 child that the party
can see and hear the child during testimony.
The Supreme Court, in the first of a series of cases involving these new
laws, tested the constitutionality of this provision, as applied to criminal
49
defendants, under the Sixth Amendment.
Justice Scalia wrote for the majority in Coy, quoting President Eisenhower and a certain well-known Elizabethan playwright to bolster his
point, and daring to challenge Wigmore's reasoning in the process. 150
During the trial, a screen separated the defendant, a man accused of
sexually molesting two thirteen-year-old girls, and the two young accusers
as they testified. 5 ' The courtroom had been darkened and a row of
bright lights was focused upon one side of the screen. 5 2 The reflection
protected the young girls from the vision of the defendant on the other
side, but the defendant could see a shadowy image of them as they
spoke from the stand. 53 The Court held, in no uncertain terms, that the
procedure, as implemented in that case, had violated the Confrontation
Clause. 5 4 The opinion, however, left open the possibility of exceptions
to that ruling in the name of "important public policy.' 15
The opinion divided the procedural protections afforded by the Confrontation Clause into two types: essential and implied.'5 6 Face-to-face
confrontation was cited as the heart of the Clause. 5 7 The defendant had
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to be able to see the witnesses as they testified. 5 All other aspects of
the confrontation right-specifically, the limitation of the admissibility
of out-of-court statements and the guarantee of an opportunity to engage
the witness in effective cross-examination-were mere appendages, which
accounted for the copious amounts of litigation resulting in their restriction. 5 9 Scalia attacked Wigmore's theory that the primary purpose
of confrontation was to enable cross-examination, in which case "[iut
follow[ed] that, if the accused ha[d] had the benefit of cross-examination,6
he ha[d] had the very privilege secured to him by the Constitution."' 0
Justice Scalia equated this with saying that "the right to a jury trial can
be dispensed with so long as the accused [was) justly convicted and
publicly known to be justly convicted-the purposes of the right to a
jury trial." Yet for years, the Supreme Court had been looking to the
purposes served by the Confrontation Clause in order to allow for
exceptions to its literal demands. Justice Scalia asserted that this case
was unique, in that it dealt directly with the fundamental core of the
Clause, face-to-face confrontation during testimony, as opposed to the
corollary aspects of the Clause dealt with in previous cases.' 6'
Justice O'Connor wrote separately in Coy, although she joined Justice
Scalia's opinion in its entirety, addressing the issue of acceptable infringements on the fundamental confrontation right. Justice Scalia noted
that even the core value of the Clause could perhaps be compromised
"when necessary to further an important public policy."' 62 He also
explicitly stated that because "other types of violations of the Confrontation Clause [were] subject to ... harmless error analysis" there was
no apparent reason why a "denial of face-to-face confrontation should
not be treated the same.' 1 63 Justice O'Connor drew on Justice Scalia's
presumptions to explore possible acceptable exceptions.
Justice O'Connor recognized that "virtually all of [the Court's] cases
approving the use of hearsay evidence [had] implicated the literal right
to 'confront." ' 164 It was her straightforward view that the concept of
face-to-face confrontation, not simply in the form of verbal cross-examination, had always been seen as the Clause's core value, and hence
none of the previous exceptions which impliedly violated it were problematic. 65 Unfortunately, she did not go on to explore the importance
of this core value, nor was such an exploration undertaken in the cases
she cited as recognizing face-to-face confrontation as an inherent yet not
inviolable aspect of the Clause.' 66 Ultimately, Justice O'Connor concluded
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that "if a court [made] a case-specific finding of necessity . . . the
strictures of the Confrontation Clause [could] give way to the compelling
state interest of protecting child witnesses." 167 She was moved to contribute
her own insights, she wrote, by her fear that Justice Scalia's opinion
may have stressed too strongly the importance of face-to-face confrontation as protected by the Clause. 16 Regardless of the validity of that
slight criticism, Justice O'Connor did not offer an alternative measurement. She suggested that the issue had been implicitly dealt with by all
the previous Confrontation Clause cases, and in one sense she is right,
but none of those previous cases addressed the issue directly. Instead,
it was sublimated in an effort to avoid a resolution of the familiar Mattox
dilemma, which had become blatantly troubling by the time of Coy but
remained unresolved.
Both Justices Scalia and O'Connor failed to explain the relationship
between the essential and implied protections afforded by the Clause. A
number of troubling questions are raised by this omission. If the core
value is face-to-face confrontation during testimony, then why are violations of the so-called "corollary protections" (the exclusion of hearsay
and the right to cross-examine) acceptable when they also necessarily
eliminate face-to-face confrontation during testimony? Does the right to
confront the witness really only arise if the witness in fact testifies?
Should it be easier to make exceptions to the "corollary protections"consequently resulting in the absence of any opportunity to cross-examine
an adverse witness at trial-than to allow cross-examination to take place
at trial absent actual face-to-face confrontation? These are obvious issues
created by the Court's division of the guarantees of the Clause, but any
discussion of them is conspicuously absent in Coy.
Perhaps the majority felt that the Clause had been denuded of too
much of its power and was trying to find a way to prevent a result that
it disliked when previous decisions had left the Court without much firm
footing. Suddenly facing the absence of physical confrontation in the
context of a cross-examination, the majority saw that the need to truly
evaluate its importance had arisen. Yet by emphasizing its worth and
labelling it the central aspect of the confrontation right, the Court crashed
headlong towards an interpretation of the Confrontation Clause which
would prohibit the admission of any out-of-court statements. All of the
Court's previous interpretations labelling the Clause a mere guarantor of
reliability were designed to avoid this dilemma. Justice Scalia attempted
to eliminate the dilemma entirely, without success. Logically, Justice
Scalia's descriptions of the importance of physical confrontation before
the trier of fact demand that all witnesses be subjected to such a test,
not just those who actually appear in court.

167. Id. at 1025.
168. Id. at 1022.
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D. Maryland v. Craig
The next Supreme Court case involving procedures designed to protect
young victims/witnesses was Maryland v. Craig.1 69 The trial judge invoked
a Maryland statute allowing for closed-circuit television testimony by an
alleged child abuse victim from a room near the courtroom. The witness
faced only the prosecutor and defense attorney during direct and crossexamination while being simultaneously observed by the defendant, the
jury, and the judge over a one-way TV monitor.1 70 This protected the
witness from the general trauma of testifying in open court and from
the specific trauma of viewing, or even sensing, the presence of the
accused. 7 ' The judge had the discretion to order this procedure only if
she first "determin[ed] that testimony by the child victim in the courtroom
distress such that
[would] result in the child suffering serious emotional
1' 72
communicate.'
reasonably
not
the child [could]
The Court, citing Coy, held that more than a "legislatively imposed
presumption of trauma" 1 73 would be required before the right to faceto-face confrontation with testifying witnesses could be constitutionally
overridden in the name of public policy. 74 In this case, the trial court
had made individualized findings of necessity, as mandated by the statute,
and had ordered the use of the closed-circuit television procedure in lieu
of fully confrontational cross-examination.' 75 According to the Justices,
to constitutionally justify denial of face-to-face confrontation, the trial
judge had to find not only that the courtroom setting in general would
traumatize the child, but that the presence of the defendant in particular
176
would subject the child witness to "more than de minimis" harm.
Without specifically defining the required minimum showing of harm,
the Court made clear that it lay somewhere between "mere nervousness
or excitement or some reluctance to testify" 177and the "serious emotional
distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate" required by
the Maryland statute. 17 The holding implies that the use of the screen
previously disallowed in Coy might have been allowed had the trial judge
made a finding of individual necessity.
The Court stressed that this procedure "preserve[d] all of the other
elements of the confrontation right: the child witness [had to] be competent
to testify and [had to] testify under oath; the defendant retain[ed] full
opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the judge, jury,
and defendant [were] able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor
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497 U.S. 836 (1990).
See id. at 840-43.
Id.
Id. at 840-41 (quoting MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii) (1989)).
Id. at 845 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988)).
Id.
Craig, 497 U.S. at 854-57.
Id.at 856.
Id. (quoting Wildermuth v. Maryland, 530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)).
Id. (citing MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 9-102(a)(2)).
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(and body) of the witness as he or she testifie[d] .179 Oddly, the right
of the defendant to see the witness as he or she testified was specifically
mentioned as important, perhaps as a justification of Coy, when logically
this in itself would have no effect upon the veracity of the testimony.
Perhaps the underlying idea was that the knowledge of the defendant
watching might have had some impact on the witness. Or perhaps it was
just mentioned without much thought as to its true significance, but
given Justice O'Connor's thorough style, this does not seem likely. It
hovers in the opinion, a subtle clue that the Court did not want to do
away with the element of physical confrontation entirely. Maybe a procedure preventing the accused from viewing the witnesses would never
pass muster. The interesting and still unanswered question, one key to
the resolution of the Mattox dilemma, remained the true weight the
Justices attributed to this aspect of confrontation.
Justice Scalia passionately wrote in dissent that the Court had subordinated the "explicit constitutional text to currently favored public
policy." 0 Apparently, he was retracting his concession in Coy that
physical confrontation, even as "the irreducible literal meaning of the
Clause,"' 81 might occasionally give way to public policy concerns. In his
view, the majority's "reasoning abstract[ed] from the right to its purposes,
and then eliminate[d] the right."'1 82 As almost all of the Court's postBruton cases illustrated, this was common methodology.' 83 Justice Scalia,
however, distinguished those cases by arguing that they all dealt with
peripheral confrontation rights, such as the protection against the introduction of hearsay. These peripheral rights were clearly not inviolable. 18 4
What Justice Scalia failed to explain was why the right to confront
witnesses face-to-face at trial became so incredibly important only once
trial testimony had begun. Given his logic, and the logic the Court had
been using for years, the Confrontation Clause would have no real effect
on whether some witnesses had to testify at all. In other words, hearsay
statements of unavailable witnesses could be admitted, as long as they
possessed presumed or proven "indicia of reliability," because that served
the purposes of the Clause.'8 5 Yet if a witness happened to actually testify,
Justice Scalia saw it as vital that he or she did so only in the presence
of the defendant. Why was it vital? Did it guarantee reliability in some
special way? Why should it be easier to completely avoid live testimony
through the use of a hearsay exception than to modify the face-to-face
element? These were the same questions left unanswered by Justice Scalia's
18 6
opinion in Coy.
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id. at 851.
Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 861 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 865 (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1020-1021 (1988)).
Id. at 862.
See supra and infra parts IV-VI.
Id. at 862-67.
See supra and infra parts IV-VI.
See supra notes 144-68 and accompanying text.
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According to Justice Scalia, the Court could not validly find that the
unwillingness of the children to testify in the presence of the defendant
rendered them unavailable. 8 7 In Justice Scalia's view, the children should
have been forced to face the accused or forego testifying because their
refusal to testify was based on mere unwillingness.18 This reasoning
directly contradicts prior precedent. Justice Scalia calls for blanket exclusion of the evidence if the witness refuses to open his mouth on the
stand in the presence of the accused. Green, in harmony with Bourjaily,
Roberts, and other post-Bruton cases, suggests that when a witness refuses
to open his mouth on the stand the substance of his testimony should
be allowed in anyway, provided it is sufficiently reliable. m9
Justice Scalia argues that the state's real interest in this case was not
to protect the welfare of the child but to secure "more convictions of
guilty defendants.' 190 In his view this was a valid public interest, but it
should not have been cloaked in the pretense of shielding child victims/
witnesses from harm. 91 If that was really the intention of the state,
argued Justice Scalia, the prosecution could have proceeded without their
testimony. 92 This was a simplistic argument. Possibly the state was
protecting the children by making sure the case, which was probably
based almost exclusively on their testimony, was presented fully in order
to ensure the long-term protection of the children from the person accused
of harming them. If the children could not speak due to the presence
of the defendant, through lack of will or sheer terror, the case would
probably have been fatally weakened. This was the difficult question
facing the Court, and in all fairness to the majority, it should be seen
as the important state interest at stake.
Still tenable, however, is the argument that the literal guarantee of the
Confrontation Clause should not be violated regardless of the compelling
nature of the competing public consideration, whatever it might be.
Ultimately, Justice Scalia declared the Court had improperly used an
"interest-balancing" test to amend the Constitution, 93 but he seemed
especially impassioned by the particular issues of the case at hand. He
.strongly urged that in these specific situations, face-to-face confrontation
could prevent the conviction of innocent people.l'4 For precisely the reason
the state wanted to exclude face-to-face confrontation-the effect it would
have upon the testifying child-Justice Scalia felt it should be included.1 9
In his opinion, allowing the jury to witness the demeanor of the child
as he or she faced the accused adult would irreplaceably aid the process
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Craig, 497 U.S. at 862-67.
Id. at 866-67.
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Craig, 497 U.S. at 867.
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of distinguishing untruthful tales from truthful accounts of sexual abuse.-96
Given this impassioned viewpoint, Justice Scalia's apparent or at least
partial acceptance of the Court's previous doctrine is odd. It implies that
he would allow into evidence any accusatory statements the child had
made (provided she was unavailable and not just "willfully" silent) which
either fell under some traditional exception to the hearsay rule; had been
previously tested by cross-examination or its equivalent at a preliminary
hearing or deposition in the presence of the defendant; or otherwise
possessed "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 197
Idaho v. Wright
On the same day that the Court heard Craig, they listened to arguments
in the case of Idaho v. Wright. 198 In that case, a pediatrician who examined
two young girls found physical evidence "strongly suggestive of sexual
abuse with vaginal contact."' 99 The judge found that the youngest child
was "not capable of communicating to the jury," but did not find her
incompetent. 200 Due to this incapacity, the judge allowed the pediatrician
to relate the contents of an interview he conducted with the girl during
the investigation of the abuse as evidence under Idaho's residual hearsay
exception rule. The rule focused on the reliability and importance of the
evidence regardless of the availability of the witness. 20 1 The Supreme
Court of Idaho disagreed with the trial judge, finding the doctor's
interviewing technique inadequate to guarantee reliability because it was
not recorded, the doctor used leading questions, and the doctor had a
preconceived notion of what the girl should tell him. 20 2 Under these
to the
circumstances, the admission into evidence of the girl's statements
20 3
pediatrician violated the defendant's right of confrontation.
The Supreme Court of the United States agreed, but on different
grounds. First, the Court made it clear that the Confrontation Clause
had to be read "in conformance with the Framers' preference for faceto-face accusation. ' ' 204 Therefore, the unavailability of the witness had

E.

196. Id.
197. See supra parts IV-VI.
198. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
199. Id.at 809.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 811-12 (citing IDAHo RULE Evm. 803(24)):
Rule 803. Hearsay exceptions; availability of declarant immaterial.-The following
are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a
witness. . . . (24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of
the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence
of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it
is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of
justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence).
202. Id.at 812-13.
203. Id.at 812.
204. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. at 814 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980)).
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to be shown. °5 In this case, the judge's finding of the little girl's incapacity
to communicate to the jury was unchallenged, and the Court found it
a sufficient basis to "assume" the child was unavailable since the issue
had not been discussed in any of the previous proceedings. 206 Given this,
the Court focused solely on the reliability of the statements. Idaho's
residual hearsay rule was not a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception. If
the Court classified it as such, "virtually every codified hearsay exception"
would automatically pass constitutional muster under the Confrontation
Clause, and the Court wanted the Clause to remain a protection somehow
above and beyond an exclusionary rule of evidence. 20 7 Thus the crux of
the question became the "indicia of reliability" surrounding the statements.208 Proper factors to consider included, but were not limited to,
spontaneity and consistent repetition, the mental state of the declarant,
the use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, and a lack
of motive to fabricate. 2 09 The judge should look to the child's behavior
and language at the time of the interview to determine whether the child
had been speaking the truth.
The dissent took issue with the majority's rejection of the use of
corroborating evidence as an indicia of reliability. 210 The majority held
that using corroborative evidence would be improper given "the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be
so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility." ' 21 The dissent pointed out that corroborating evidence had
been used to support the reliability of coconspirator confessions admitted
against codefendants when the declarant refused to take the stand and
hence could not be confronted through cross-examination. 21 2 The majority
distinguished these cases, arguing that the use of corroborative evidence,
while helpful in circumstances involving interlocking confessions, would
not be fruitful in the case at hand since physical corroborative evidence
would not shed light on whether the child was telling the truth when
the statement was made. 2 3 This is not a truly satisfactory distinction
since the same could be said of interlocking confessions. The knowledge
that confessions are consistent with each other and with other evidence
sheds no light on the circumstances under which they are made. Nevertheless, the Court held that corroboration was an improper consideration
in Wright and, given the absence of any of the other factors cited as
useful indicia of the reliability of the statements, held that the defendant's
rights under the Confrontation Clause had been21 4violated by the admission
of the doctor's recollections of the interview.
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It is interesting to note in passing that Justice Scalia joins in this
opinion, even though the Court assumed the child was unavailable to
testify in a situation very similar to Craig, where Justice Scalia insisted
that the child was not unavailable but merely unwilling.
F.

White v. Illinois
In 1992, in White v. Illinois,215 the Supreme Court confronted a decision
by a trial judge to allow into evidence crucial hearsay statements of a
child who twice was called to the stand by the State, but apparently left
the courtroom in distress each time and never testified. 2 6 No evidence
concerning the degree of trauma the girl would experience if she were
compelled to testify was presented, and the judge never made a finding
that she was "unavailable. ' 217 The child's babysitter, who had allegedly
been awakened by the little girl's scream and gone to her room just in
time to see the boyfriend of the girl's mother leaving the scene, was
allowed to recount, as evidence, statements the girl made after he questioned her as to what had happened. 218 Similarly, the mother and a police
officer related from the stand what the child had told them during the
four hours immediately following the alleged assault. 21 9 Finally, a doctor
and an emergency room nurse were permitted to testify concerning statements the girl made during examinations and interviews. 220 All objections
on the part of the defendant to the admission of the above hearsay
statements were overruled on two grounds: (1) the testimony of the first
three witnesses was permissible under the "spontaneous declaration"
exception, and (2) the testimony of the medical personnel qualified both
as spontaneous declarations and as "statement[s] made in the course of
2 21
securing medical treatment.
The defendant argued that, according to Roberts, the Confrontation
Clause demanded a judicial ruling that the witness was unavailable to
testify before her statements could be allowed in under any "firmly rooted
hearsay exception. "222 The Supreme Court disagreed, arguing that any
such implication in Roberts was meaningless given Inadi, leaving the
unavailability requirement applicable only to cases where the testimony
consisted of statements made during a prior judicial proceeding. 223 The
Court distinguished Roberts from White by arguing that statements made
during the course of a prior judicial proceeding were materially different
from those at hand, since the former were not in danger of losing
evidentiary value if replaced by live testimony. 224 This, combined with
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 357.

Summer 1996]

INTERPRETATION

OF CONFRONTATION CLAUSE

the fact that "a statement that qualifie[d] for admission under a 'firmly
rooted' hearsay exception [was] so trustworthy that adversarial testing
[could] be expected to add little to its reliability," led the Court to the
conclusion that "establishing a generally applicable unavailability rule
would have few practical benefits while imposing pointless litigation
costs. ' 225 The Court also distinguished Coy and Craig, declaring that
they had no relevance to the decision in this case because they "involved
only the question of what in-court procedures [were] constitutionally
required to guarantee a defendant's confrontation right once a witness
[was] testifying. 2 26 From here, the Court reasoned that the defendant's
227
confrontation right had not been violated.
In reaching their decision, the Justices assumed "as a given" that the
judge correctly found the testimony fell under the two hearsay exceptions,
because this was not an issue in the courts below. 22 The majority then
emphasized that these exceptions were "firmly rooted," hence requiring
no independent inquiry into their reliability. 229 Undoubtedly, the spontaneous declaration exception was widely recognized under the common
law, having been in existence for at least two-hundred years, 230 and its
rationale (that a statement uttered in a moment of excitement without
time to analyze the consequences of the utterance is likely to be a true
statement) would seem to apply to both children and adults. But the
second exception, specifically designated by the Illinois legislature as
applicable to both children and adults who had been sexually assaulted,
may not have been as "firmly rooted" as the Court suggested. The
opinion declared that "a statement made in the course of procuring
medical services, where the declarant knows that a false statement may
cause misdiagnosis or mistreatment, carries special guarantees of credibility
'231
that a trier of fact may not think replicated by courtroom testimony.
This analysis does not apply to the way the exception had been used.
The examihation of the child had been conducted primarily to gather
physical evidence. The girl was not taken to the emergency room until
more than four hours after the attack,232 and although she perhaps needed
tests for venereal disease or infection, she, at the age of four, was
probably not aware of the possibility that lying to a doctor could endanger
her health. Not only that, but misdiagnosis was not even an issue in
this case. Everyone was operating under the assumption that the girl had
been attacked in the manner she had described to her babysitter, her
mother, and the police officer. Under these circumstances, the exception
was certainly not "firmly rooted" in jurisprudential history. In fact one
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commentator, writing before White, lamented that this exception, as
applied to a non-testifying child witness/victim, would probably not
withstand a Confrontation Clause challenge for those very reasons. 233
Justice Thomas, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia,
suggested that the Court's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause was
unnecessarily complex. 234 In his opinion the true meaning was clear and
concise. The Clause, he wrote, simply provided that "[tihe federal constitutional right of confrontation extend[ed] to any witness who actually
testifie[d] at trial . . . [and was] implicated by extrajudicial statements
only insofar as they [were] contained in formalized testimonial materials,
such as affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions. ' 235 This
attempt at clarification drew on Wigmore's reading of the Clause: that
it only applied to witnesses who were actually called to testify, in which
case it guaranteed the accused the use of cross-examination and attempted
to reconcile it with the more widely accepted historical interpretation of
the Clause according to which any witness who wished to avoid live
testimony could not simply record her statement through some legal
236
procedure and present it to the fact-finder.
Oddly, Justice Scalia concurred in this case and joined Justice Thomas'
opinion, despite the concern he expressed in Craig of the wisdom of
protecting the child by removing the element of physical confrontation
with the defendant from the process of cross-examination. 237 In his opinion, the jury would be likely to gain helpful clues regarding the veracity
of the child by watching her demeanor as she testified in the presence
and sight of the accused. 238 Here, however, he explicitly accepted a
situation where the child not only did not face the defendant during
testimony but did not testify at all. 23 9 All the crucial evidence in the case
was admitted under the rubric of exceptions to the rule against hearsay,
yet Justice Scalia found this constitutionally acceptable under the Confrontation Clause.
Justice Thomas' claim that the Confrontation Clause was not designed
to ensure the reliability of evidence but served merely as a guarantee
that the accused would be allowed to confront any accusers who actually
testified at trial240 was a valiant effort to circumvent the shadowy reasoning
prevalent in earlier cases, but it failed to penetrate to the heart of the
problem. What was important about confrontation itself? Why was it a
right guaranteed to the accused? If confrontation, in the form of crossexamination, was not just another safeguard against false evidence, then
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what set it apart? Unfortunately, these difficult questions were not addressed by Thomas, and indeed they may be impossible to answer with
any degree of certainty or even of satisfaction. The Court has not managed
to do so in recent years, and the same dichotomy plagues the interpretation
of the Clause today.
VII.

THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION IN THE LAND OF
ENCHANTMENT

A.

State v. Ross
In a decision recently handed dow by the New Mexico Supreme Court,
State v. Ross 2. ' the Justices look to Wright 242 and Roberts243 ignoring
White,2" for the proposition that the accused's confrontation rights,
pursuant to both the state and federal constitutions, are not violated by
the admission of a non-available declarant's out-of-court statements, so
long as those statements fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception
or exhibit 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness; equivalent to
those associated with a firmly rooted exception. ' 245 As the declarant was
the deceased former wife of the defendant who was accused of murdering
her after holding her hostage for some hours, availability was not an
issue. Undertaking an analysis of the statements in question,the court
first determined that the "statement of recent perception" exception,
through which the utterances were allowed in as evidence, was not firmly
rooted. Looking to the history of the exception and its usage, the court
determined that because it was not part of the common law, was first
used in New Mexico in 1973, and because only two other states allow
its use in criminal cases since it was rejected by the United States Congress,
it could not be called firmly rooted. The second step was to look for
the aforementioned particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Extracting from Wright's holding that the indicia of reliability should be equivalent to those underlying traditional hearsay exceptions, 24 the Justices
turned to State v. Williams24 7 for a four-part test. Considering each
statement in light of the four Williams factors-ambiguity, lack of candor,
faulty memory, and misperception-the court found that two of the three
possessed sufficient signs of reliability, while the third did not. In the
case of the third statement, the court found potential ambiguity, as well
as danger of a lack of candor. The admission at trial of this third
statement, however, was deemed harmless error, and the conviction was
affirmed. 248 In exploring the issues involved in the case, the court un-
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- N.M.
919 P.2d 1080 (1996).
242. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
243. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
244. 502 U.S. 346 (1992).
245. Ross,
-N.M. at
-,
919 P.2d at 1088 (quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66
(1980)).
246. 497 U.S. at 819-20.
247. 117 N.M. 551, 560-61, 874 P.2d 12, 21-22 (1994).
248. Ross at
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dertook a detailed analysis of the reliability of each of the statements
in light of the enumerated factors, but once again, the court only discussed
the limits the Confrontation Clause placed on the admission of declarations
by unavailable witnesses without touching on the value of physical and
verbal confrontation at trial. In the words of Justice Minzner, "[t]he
evidentiary rule against hearsay and the constitutional right of confrontation are intended to protect similar interests, and the two doctrines are
intricately related. ' 249 This statement is certainly true, the problem lies
in reconciling any admission of hearsay with the explicit meaning of
confrontation as a right guaranteed the accused.
B.

State v. Lopez
In State v. Lopez, 250 a decision filed on July 22, 1996, the New Mexico
Court of Appeals turned to the New Mexico Constitution, identifying
the New Mexico Supreme Court's disregard for White as a sign that a
showing of the unavailability of the witness should remain a necessary
factor in New Mexico before the admission of extrajudicial statements
by nontestifying persons under any circumstances. Hailing the"right to
cross-examination . . . as the most important element of the right of
confrontation" 2 5' and calling it the "principal means for testing the truth
and credibility of a witness,

' 25 2

the court of appeals looked to Article

II, section 14 of the New Mexico Constitution to provide greater protection
of that right than is currently available under the United States Supreme
Court's interpretation of the federal guarantee. In the words of the Court:
Before White, it was generally thought that prior to dispensing with
critical elements of the confrontation clause, there had to be good
reason to do so (necessity) and equivalent guarantees of reliability
for the evidence sought to 25be
admitted without cross-examination or
3
face-to-face confrontation.

Citing the reliability test as the justification for eliminating actual crossexamination, the court expressed an unwillingness to allow this to occur
without first requiring the state to show that the witness is unavailable
for testimony. A trial should be a search for truth, and the jury is
entitled to all the information available through the presentation of the
best evidence. Preserving the confrontation right in its literal form increases the public perception that trial is a legitimate process. Without
the requirement of showing the unavailability of the declarant, prosecutors
would have a means of keeping a weak witness off the stand while
enjoying the ability to get his statement in through a stronger witness
under the auspices of a firmly-rooted hearsay exception. Due process
mandates that "extra pains" be taken to avoid convictions of innocent
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people. 2 4 Thus the court twists the familiar public-benefit approach,
calling for more rigorous protection for the accused instead of citing
costs to the public to justify easing the burden on the state. Society as
a whole benefits when constitutional rights are stridently enforced. The
system as a whole will benefit. And those accused who stand innocent
until proven guilty will benefit as well.
These are powerful arguments, and the court has taken an important
step by breaking away from the lead of the United States Supreme Court.
The conviction in Lopez was affirmed, the court finding the state's
showing of unavailability sufficient and that the statements, admitted as
excited utterances, fell under the rubric of firmly-rooted exceptions to
the hearsay rule. The opinion lays out the proper method for the trial
court to follow in reaching a decision concerning availability and reliability. In the words of Judge Pickard:
In determining reasonableness, the trial court should balance the efforts
undertaken by the State with the likely utility of cross-examination
under the facts of the case. In a case in which cross-examination is
shown to be essential, greater efforts would be required. Conversely,
where the defense may make its points in other25 ways, appropriate
steps to locate the witness may be less vigorous.
In measuring the utility of cross-examination, it is helpful to use the
four potential dangers generally ascribed to hearsay testimony and to
evaluate these dangers in the context of the facts of the particular
case.

25 6

This approach is exciting, in that it asks trial judges to consider each
case before them individually and to look at the facts and circumstances
of the case when dealing with the issue of the need for confrontation.
Unfortunately, it ignores an analysis of the unique utility of physical
and verbal confrontation before the trier of fact, focusing instead on
factors which go purely to the reliability of the evidence assuming it
remains untested at trial. Lopez shows a preference for face-to-face
confrontation at trial by requiring the state to jump through the hoops
of showing unavailability of a witness before attempting to get the
statements in via exceptions to the hearsay rule and reliability arguments.
But the opinion leaves the weight of the irreplaceable benefits of at-trial
examination by defense counsel out of the balance, not asking the trial
court to consider the lack of demeanor evidence and the absence of an
opportunity for the jury to watch the accuser face the accused. This is
the classic dilemma once again, and it has yet to be resolved, if such
a resolution is possible.

254. Id. at 9-10.
255. Id. at 13.
256. Id. at 14. The four factors are those cited by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Ross, 919 P.2d 1080, which were laid out earlier in State v. Williams, 117 N.M. 551, 560,
N.M.
-,
874 P.2d 12, 21 (1994).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

VIII.

(Vol. 26

NEW MEXICO FACES SOCIETY'S DESIRE TO PROTECT
YOUNG VICTIMS/WITNESSES

A.

State v. Vigil
State v. Vigil" was the earliest decision by the New Mexico Court of
Appeals allowing the use of a videotaped deposition by a child victim/
witness in a sexual assault case. This opinion cites directly back to Mattox
for the argument that public policy may outweigh the defendant's confrontation right, and stresses the fact that the accused was able to crossexamine the child at her deposition. 218 Interestingly, although the jury's
opportunity to observe the demeanor of the child via videotape as she
testified is deemed important, it is not made clear whether the accused
was present during the taping. 2 9 Presumably he was, as both the state
statute and the rule that allow for these procedures specify that the
deposition be taken in the presence of the accused. 260 Although this
opinion laid the groundwork for future New Mexico cases allowing such
testimony, it left many questions unanswered.
B.

State v. Altgilbers
in 1990, the New Mexico Court of Appeals found that the use of
prior statements and videotaped depositions at trial did not violate the
right of the accused to confront his two daughters who testified regarding
alleged sexual abuse. 26' Interestingly, the defendant's appellate briefs argued that the admission of prior hearsay statements made by the children
violated his confrontation right, but "went no further than to claim that
the evidence was not admissible under any hearsay exception. ' 262 The
court analyzed the issue independently, and determined that the admission
of the statements was constitutionally permissible as "the opportunity
for cross-examination," not actual cross-examination itself, "is the key." 26a
Because the children were available for questioning by defense counsel
concerning the out-of-court statements at their videotaped depositions,
those statements were admissible, provided that the use of the videotaped
depositions themselves at trial did not violate the confrontation clause. 26
The defendant relied on Coy v. Iowa265 to argue that the use of the
depositions was unconstitutional. The court, citing prior precedent, argued
that Coy applied only when the judge "fail[ed] to make individualized
findings that the particular witnesses require[d] protection against testifying

257. 103 N.M. 583, 711 P.2d 28 (Ct. App. 1985).
258. Id. at 586-87, 711 P.2d at 31-32.
259. Id.
260. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-9-17(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1995); N.M. R. CRN. P. DIST. CT. 5-509(B)(2).
261. State v. Altgilbers, 109 N.M. 453, 768 P.2d 680 (Ct. App. 1989); cert. denied, 109 N.M.
419, 705 P.2d 1038 (1990).
262. Id. at 460, 768 P.2d at 687.
263. Id. (quoting State v. Tafoya, 105 N.M. 117, 122, 729 P.2d 1371, 1376 (Ct. App. 1986)),
vtcated and remanded on other grounds, 487 U.S. 1229 (1988).
264. Altgilbers, 109 N.M. at 460, 768 P.2d at 687.
265. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
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at trial face-to-face with the defendant." 26 Because the trial court had
determined after hearing testimony from the children's therapist and
psychologist that both alleged victims would suffer harm if forced to
testify before the defendant, the videotaped procedure passed constitutional muster, despite its variance from the rule. 267 As the children were
deposed and videotaped prior to trial, the defendant watched them from
a one-way glass booth, and he was able to communicate with his attorney
through headphones. This was similar to the procedure used in State v.
Tafoya, but unlike Tafoya, it is not clear whether the children knew the
268
The
defendant could see them even though they could not see him.
court does not discuss the importance of this knowledge, even though
it is specifically mentioned as a factor to be considered, nor does it
discuss how these procedures safeguard the various aspects of the confrontation right, relying instead on the proposition that an opportunity
for cross-examination of the witnesses satisfies the constitution, both with
regards to the admission of hearsay and the use of previously recorded
testimony. 269 This case clearly varies from the early precedent set by Vigil,
which stressed the trauma of in-court testimony and did not discuss the
possibility of protecting the accusers from the presence of the accused.
Once more, the confrontation right has been narrowed without an exploration of the difficult issues involved. Without claiming that demeanor
evidence has no value, the court has eliminated the element of physical
confrontation and has, perhaps, failed to preserve the middle ground
wherein the accuser knows he is being observed by the accused.
C. State v. Fairweather
The New Mexico Supreme Court confronted this issue in State v.
270
reinforcing the earlier reasoning of the court of appeals,
Fairweather,
and narrowing the confrontation right in that context one more degree.
Unlike the accused in Taylor and Altgilbers, the defendant in Fairweather
was not provided the opportunity to communicate via headphones with
his attorney during the depositions. 27' Instead, he was able to send him
notes and meet with him during recesses.2 72 Finding that the trial court,
through the use of specific findings of harm, "properly balanced Fairweather's right to confront his accusers and the interests of protecting
the minor witnesses," the court upheld the use of the previously-recorded
testimony. 273 The court asserted that "[o]f the elements that comprise
the right of confrontation, Fairweather was denied only a face-to-face

266. Algilbers, 109 N.M. at 460-61, 786 P.2d at 687-88 (citing State v. Tafoya, 108 N.M. 1, 765
P.2d 1183 (App. 1988)), aff'g, 105 N.M. 117, 729 P.2d 1371 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. denied, 489
U.S. 1097 (1989).
267. Id. -at 461, 786 P.2d at 688.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. 116 N.M. 456, 863 P.2d 1077 (1993).
271. Id. at 462-463, 863 P.2d 1083-1084.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 463, 863 P.2d at 1084.
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encounter," failing to mention the fact that the jury would see only
videotaped demeanor evidence and would not see the demeanor of the
accuser facing the accused. 274 In fact, once again, it was not even made
27
clear if the children knew they were being watched by the defendant.
Finally, the court argued that Fairweather's inability to communicate
simultaneously with his defense counsel during the questioning of the
children was meaningless unless he could show specific prejudice caused
"by his exclusion from the witness's presence or the restriction placed
on his counsel. 2 76 Again, this opinion fails to consider the ways in which
the absence of traditional cross-examination might hurt the accused,
placing the burden on the defendant to explain this, in a specific rather
than generalized manner, to the court. The New Mexico judiciary has
not dealt any more directly with this issue than has the United States
Supreme Court, and that is not surprising, given the daunting difficulty
of the dilemma that has plagued the legal system since it was first
recognized in the Mattox opinion.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Issues Facing the Courts
Courts must squarely confront the dichotomy of Clause interpretation:
the twisted path between the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause
which prohibits the use of any out-of-court statements and an interpretation that views the Clause as no more than a rule of evidence can no
longer be traversed. By the time of Bourjaily, the Supreme Court had
clearly moved toward the latter interpretation, and in Coy it moved back
toward the former, leaving future decisions to grapple with the glaring
inconsistencies. Generally, this has been done by avoiding the issues and
reaching the desired result through any language necessary. Given the
historical progression of the Supreme Court's Confrontation Clause opinions, this result was almost inevitable. Trying to maintain a middleground without resolving the conflict between the apparent demands of
the Confrontation Clause and important rules of evidence and issues of
public policy is impossible. Too many cases have drawn the dilemma
into the light, and skirting it has become a superhuman task. Logically,
it may be up to the Supreme Court to lead the way, but not necessarily.
State supreme courts, including that of New Mexico, which enjoy the
freedom to interpret their own constitutions as more protective than the
federal equivalent, may blaze their own trail, following the recent example
of the New Mexico Court of Appeals. 277
A.

274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Fairweather, 116 N.M. at 463, 836 P.2d at 1084.
277. State v. Lopez, No. 15,920 (filed July 22, 1996), at 7-10. Hawaii and Ohio have also decided
to pursue their own course. Id..
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Some Modest Suggestions
Reconciling the two competing doctrines will not be easy, but imposing
legal minds have admirably wrestled many intellectual tangles into comprehensible form. In tying the two strands of the Confrontation Clause
cases together, courts should keep several considerations in mind. The
primary concern should be to avoid travelling too far in either direction.
The notion that the Clause is simply a guarantee of reliable evidence
needs to be disregarded, and the importance of the special aspects of
physical and verbal confrontation must be considered within the context
of each separate case or type of case.
One step towards this resolution was suggested by William H. Baker
almost twenty years ago. 2 In his view, the Confrontation Clause requires
a showing that a witness is truly unavailable, despite good faith efforts
by the prosecution to secure his live testimony, before any hearsay may
be used as evidence. 279 Once a finding of unavailability has been made,
the Court should examine the reliability of the evidence under the Due
Process Clause. 2 0 Thus the Confrontation Clause would require live
testimony whenever possible, yet would allow for the introduction of
out-of-court statements when extraneous circumstances so dictate. This
idea is interesting as it divorces the Clause from the concept of reliability,
thereby apparently lessening the danger of reducing the Clause to an
embodiment of the rule against hearsay, while at the same time avoiding
a summary prohibition of all out-of-court statements.
Unfortunately, certain problems of interpretation would persist. For
example, the dilemma of deciding whether vulnerable victims/witnesses
should be considered "unavailable" due to the psychological stress of
testimony would remain unresolved. If the declarant would apparently
be harmed primarily by the sight of the defendant during testimony, then
the problem would be the constitutionality of shielding him from the
defendant's presence. The option of simply declaring the witness unavailable under those circumstances, rather than having him undergo crossexamination absent the element of physical confrontation, would be a
viable, yet unsatisfactory, solution.
B.

278. See, e.g., William H. Baker, The Right to Confrontation, the Hearsay Rules, and Due
Process-A Proposal for Determining When Hearsay May Be Used In Criminal Trials, 6 CONN.
L. REV. 529, 544-545 (1974):
The accommodation proposed is that there be a right to confront and cross-examine
one's accusers, but that the right be conditioned on the availability of the witness.
More particularly, it is proposed that the confrontation clause should be interpreted
to require that states make "reasonable efforts" to produce available witnesses
before the use of hearsay is allowed. "Reasonable efforts would be defined in
terms of the "degree of difficulty in procuring the witness and the "degree of
importance" of the particular evidence to the maintenance of the state's case. Once
a state has shown that it has made "reasonable efforts" to produce all available
witnesses it will have satisfied its obligations under the confrontation clause. It
would then be free to use hearsay, in lieu of the actual declarant, provided that
the hearsay is sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the requirements of the Due Process
Clause.
279. Id.
280. Id.
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The Court has avoided resolving this issue by balancing the rights of
the defendant against the interests of society in protecting young accusers.
This process is deceptive, given a consistent failure to clarify how much
the importance of confrontation actually weighs. This problem first arose
with the use of the balancing test in Mattox and reappeared with the
revival of the test during the post-Bruton era. The true value of effective
cross-examination, both verbal and physical challenge, has never been
clarified, even as281the Court declared it less important than the public
interest at stake.
The admission of out-of-court statements when the witness is unavailable
is, basically, a concession to public interest. Therefore, doing away with
the "reliability" doctrine and requiring proof of the unavailability of the
witness before allowing any out-of-court statements into evidence is a
first step, but further refinement is necessary. In order to justify the
absence of the "preferred" method prescribed by the Confrontation
Clause, namely traditional cross-examination at trial consisting of verbal
and physical challenge, in the name of "unavailability," the true value
of that preferred method should be explored in depth.
The Court must undertake a detailed analysis of the unique aspects
of verbal and physical trial confrontation. The roots of this exploration
can be found in many Supreme Court opinions, 2s 2 but, unfortunately,
the Court has merely enumerated aspects of confrontation recognized as
historically important, failing to link them to the scenario at hand. Justice
Scalia, in his pained dissent in Craig, did delve into such an analysis,
arguing that the situation demanded the element of physical confrontation
so the factfinder could observe the reaction of an allegedly abused child
to the presence of the accused abuser. He argued that the sight of the
defendant, especially when the accused was a parent, might cause the
child to hesitate before delivering a false account of abuse. This idea,
though it is certainly far from noncontroversial, has some appeal, given
the damning societal response to charges of sexual molestation and the
existence of cases where such harsh claims are first raised during custody
battles. Of course, some people may argue that children should be
protected even more stringently when the alleged abuser is a relative.
There are many other imaginable scenarios where the identity of the
accused and the accuser will lead experts to similarly conflicting opinions.283

281. See supra parts IV-VI.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 8 and 101 (Blackmun's list of factors in Ohio v. Roberts).
283. See, e.g., Craig v. Maryland, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)(Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Psychological Association, 1987) (arguing that there is strong evidence that serious emotional trauma
may be inflicted upon children by courtroom confrontation with their alleged accusers) and for the
opposite conclusion see Ralph Underwager and Hollida Wakefield, Poor Psychology Produces Poor
Law, 16 L. & HuM. BEHAv. 233, 235 (1992) (arguing that the A.P.A.'s brief had "overstate[d] the
data, fail[ed] to adequately present limits and qualifications of the studies it cite[d], and mixe[d]
together empirical research, clinical observations, clinical experience, and theories as if all had equal
weight. ").
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Despite this difficulty, trial courts could conceivably hear informed
argument on both sides of the issue and make case-specific decisions
concerning the value of the elements of confrontation, physical and verbal,
through the use of tools such as Special Masters. 28 4 This process could
be employed in difficult cases when the child's advocate asks the judge
to declare the child "unavailable" or to alter trial procedure by eliminating
the element of physical confrontation. After listening to the findings of
a Special Master, or some other neutral court-appointed information
gatherer, the court could make an informed decision to either declare
the child unavailable and admit the substance of her testimony in some
other form, alter trial procedure in such a way that the child would be
able to testify live, or rule that the child had to undergo traditional
cross-examination. Ideally, the judge would have specific information
concerning the importance of confrontation, physical and verbal, in that
particular situation and knowledge of the degree of difficulty that individual child might face if forced to testify. This same type of contextual
analysis could be used across the board in Confrontation Clause cases
involving the question of "unavailability."
Of course, there are problems inherent in this approach. Decisions
weighing the value of the elements of confrontation might appear arbitrary, and the process would be open to abuse. Also, the requirements
of finding unavailability and determining the relative value of trial confrontation each time the issue arose would burden an already overloaded
court system, and critics may cite this alone as reason to avoid any such
procedural mandate. However, guidelines would develop as the body of
precedent grew, and ideally the approach to various problems would
become well structured over time, thereby lessening both the appearance
and danger of arbitrariness, and the extra burden on the judicial system.
Still, courts may regard this approach as too dangerous because certain
procedures the majority of the Supreme Court clearly desires to protect,
such as joint trials, would be in danger of losing their constitutional
status. Not only that, but it may simply seem unworkable, and perhaps
rightly so. And yet, in light of the twisted paths judges have travelled
over years of struggling with the true meaning of the right of confrontation, this approach may have some merit. It may at least illuminate
the various obstacles legal minds must overcome in order to reach a
unified interpretation of the Confrontation Clause.

284. Special Masters are court-appointed experts who assist the judge with difficult subjects that
require specialized knowledge.

